Vietnam's government has implemented a high level protection policy on its domestic automobile industry. The paper is to provide an answer to the question whether that policy has been successful or not. Using quantitative analysis methods and data collected from various sources, we conclude that it up to now has been a failure, in terms of key policy targets and welfare surplus. The industry remains 'infant' while both consumer and government lose. The research suggests a revision of the protection process and a clarification of government's policy objectives.
Introduction
Vietnam began its economic renovation in 1986 aimed at industrialization and modernization.
Similar to many other developing countries, Vietnam's government regards the automobile industry as one of the future growth engines of the economy. In order to develop the industry from infant status, the government has implemented many protection measures. The study of the impacts of the protection has recently become an interesting topic, especially for the policy debate on Vietnam's automobile industry.
As local content (or 'localization') is one of the key targets oriented by the government, Nguyen (2007) studies localization in Vietnam's automobile industry focusing on the process of increasing the value added to automobile products under regional and international integration. She indicates that in spite of the protection provided by the government, the localization rate of the automobile industry remains below expectations. As a result, she concludes that the present policy is unsuitable and ineffective.
In another studies, Fukase and Martin (2000) refer to the automobile industry as an example of inappropriate protection in the light of Vietnam's integration into the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) . They analyze the case of high tariffs on assembled car imports and conclude that protection leads to high production costs rather than high profits. In addition, their analysis demonstrates that the government's policy leads to loss on all sides: consumers, government and even producers.
In terms of the impacts of protection policy on the automobile industry, similar research has been done for Asian developing countries. For instance, Okamoto and Sjoholm (1999) inspect the dynamics of productivity growth of the automotive industries (involving automobile and motorcycle) in Indonesia under government protection. They use establishment data which are on the entrance and exit from one industry for the Indonesian automotive industries in the period 1990-1995 and assert that governmental intervention has caused a low productivity performance in Indonesia's automotive industries. In particular, they argue that the government's interference has not been successful in lifting the industry from 'infant' status.
On the other hand, Lihui (2007) examines the development of China's automobile industry under government intervention, in comparison with China's free-entry-and-exit computer industry. He finds that the automobile industry is more concentrated and less efficient than the computer sector. As a result, he suggests that China's government should encourage international competitiveness of China's automobile firms rather than protect or enforce intervention into their operations.
Concerning similar questions, Wonnacott (1965) argues that the government protection leads to a significant increase in production costs in Canada's automobile industry. Furthermore, Bennett and Sharpe (1979) claim that a protection policy should contain requirements, such as local content or export promotion requirement, in order to obtain an effective goal. Some other research (see Fleet 1982; Shapiro 1989 ) support this argument from investigating Latin American automobile industries (particularly Brazil, Argentina and Mexico).
Theoretically, Feenstra (2004) , Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) argue that whether a protection at early stages of an 'infant industry' has any rationale or not depends on the functioning status of other markets, such as capital markets. In terms of welfare for the case of a tariff, both Feenstra (2004) , Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) assert that for a small importing country, a tariff always leads to social losses, including terms of consumer surplus loss and the increase in marginal costs of production. They argue that for a large country, whether total welfare is reduced or not also depends on the level of tariffs imposed.
Taken together, these studies indicate a possible ineffectiveness of protection policy on the automobile industry in the early stages. However, previous studies focus on only one aspect such as local content (Nguyen 2007) , and do not provide much evidence (Fukase and Martin 2000) , or use indirect approaches (Lihui 2007; Okamoto and Sjoholm 1999) . Domestically, many papers have discussed the right or wrong of Vietnam's protection policy on the automobile industry (see, for example, Vietnam Economics Times, Vnexpress.net, Labour, Vietnamnet.net). However, most have been based on qualitative comments on the performance of Vietnam's automobile industry without an analysis of the whole impacts. The question of whether the protection policies bring benefits to all three sides: domestic automobile manufacturers, consumers and the government in terms of each side's targets has not been solved by any single paper, using quantitative analysis. The purpose of this paper is to investigate impacts on each side including the government, consumers and producers, in terms of their targets. Using several approaches involving welfare analysis, quantitative synthesis and relevant comparisons, this paper provides evidence of the failure of the protection policy on the automobile industry in Vietnam. It also suggests that the government -the key side -should review and clarify the appropriate targets and strategies for the domestic automobile industry in order to obtain real development of the industry and maintain the balance of co-benefits among related sides.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 describes the data and methodology. Section 3 shows the results obtained from the quantitative analysis. Then, we provide some discussion including the policy implications in Section 4. Section 5 is the conclusion with suggestions for possible further research.
Data and Methodology
In order to examine the success of the protection policy in terms of benefits, some research uses the labour productivity growth model to investigate impacts of protection (Okamoto and Sjoholm 1999) , or total factor productivity models to compare the impacts with another unprotected industry (Lihui 2007) . Some papers use table comparisons to judge policy influences (Green 1992) . Aiming to provide an overall picture of impacts on all three related sides, this paper is based on quantitative analysis without using an econometric model. In Yearbooks and other sources, which are cited particularly. However, there are still some gaps in the collected data, especially for the price comparisons. This comes from the fact that some car models are produced in Vietnam only and it is difficult to find a similar car in the world market in terms of the same engine size and other technical configurations.
Results
Results are reported with respect to the protection process and economic performance of Vietnam's automobile firms. Those are linked in a logical order to create an overall picture of the protection policy on Vietnam's automobile industry. Some implications on the impacts of the protection are discussed in Section 4.
Protection policy
Traditionally, in order to develop a domestic industry from its infant status, governments usually provide protection to that industry, through trade policy instruments: high tariffs, quotas and some other non-tariff barriers. A tariff on an imported good, or other tools, is to increase the price of that good, in order to protect domestic producers from import competition (Krugman and Obstfeld 2003) . Even in developed countries, it has been shown that a temporarily rational protection on the 'infant period' is sometimes helpful for the development of the automobile industry (see, for instance, Lewchuk 1987). However, whether the policy is successful or not depends on the suitability of policy targets and instruments used along the protection process.
Targets of the policy. In Vietnam, the automobile industry is considered an important priority to develop in order to contribute effectively to industrialization, modernization and construction of national security and defense (Decision No. 177/2004/QD-TTg). As a result, the government issued policies to establish and develop an automobile industry with two main targets: satisfaction of the domestic demand and localization ratio, in which the localization ratio (or local content rate, value added locally) is the key indicator of an 'infant' or 'mature' automobile industry (see Table 1 ). by the government that it is necessary to limit the number of vehicles by taxes because of the current low situation of Vietnam transport infrastructure. Nevertheless, this seemed to reflect the short-term vision in the process of policy making in the field of automobile industry.
Protection instruments. Since the political events in Russia and
Unlike some other countries (Li 2000) , the local content is not applied as a compulsory requirement of imports, but it is still one of the key targets of the government. The imposition of import inspection by customs is also not an instrument of protection, however, there is a restriction of special automobile import harbors (especially for used cars).
In addition to tariffs, the government used the excise tax as an instrument for protection.
Domestically manufactured or assembled motor vehicles were originally not subject to excise 1993 , 28 October 1995 , 20 May 1998 , and 17 June 2003 However, the supporting automobile industry which supplies auto components for assembling factories is still far from expectations, in both quantity and quality aspects. Most of the component and part auto producers have the small production scale and their products are mainly simple, lowly technological, therefore they contribute poor value in the local content ratio. Table 4 ).
Localization. Among FDI firms, only Toyota and Honda reach 20 per cent of the localization ratio, all other companies remain from 1.5 to 14 per cent. There are six domestic companies having higher localization ratio of 35 -60 per cent mainly because their products are cheap price trucks and buses, which do not require a high technology for secondary parts, except for engines. Price comparison. Table 9 (Appendix) shows some price comparisons, which compare retail prices of the same models in the world market (in the USA and other Asian markets particularly) and the domestic market for same or similar models. Prices of the assembled cars are about 1.7 to 3 times higher than the world price, while prices of the imported cars are about 2.2 to 3 times higher. The average value of price ratio (domestic price/world price) is 2.31.
Discussion

Impacts of protection: gainers and losers
It is relevant to investigate the impacts of protection policy by examining positive and negative effects to related beneficiaries, based on their targets or roles. In this part, we try to indicate the impacts that the protection policy has influenced the three sides: consumers, domestic manufacturers and government. In addition, other forces may be considered as related sides such as automobile importers, transporters or foreign exporters. However, in the scope of this paper, we only cover the impacts on the directly related beneficiaries.
Theoretically, a tariff leads to an increase in the price of a good in the importing country and a decline of it in the exporting country. Therefore, consumers will gain in the exporting country and lose in the importing country. In contrast, producers lose in the exporting country and gain in the importing country. Moreover, the government will gain revenue from imposing the tariff (Krugman and Obstfeld 2003) . That is generally also the case of Vietnam's automobile industry with the behavior of a small importing country.
Consumers. As consumers in a small country where the infant automobile industry is
protected by high tariffs, Vietnam's consumers must accept higher prices in comparison with the world price. Price contains the components: tariffs + excise tax + value added tax + other importation expenses, including commodity inspection charges, bank charges, foreign trade agency charges for port entry + other expenses incurred between the time automobiles are declared at customs and the time they are sold (Li 2000) .
From Table 9 (Appendix), Vietnamese consumers must pay about 2-3 times more than the US or other Asian consumers to own the same car. This does not count for the fact that the quality standard is lower for the domestic assembled cars in comparison with the one sold in the developed market. However, the increase with a high rate of car sales (see Table 7 ) implies more about the relationship between the increasing rates of income, the elasticity of automobile demands on price, which is out of the scope of this paper. In addition, in the early period when imports of cars were banned (before 2005), the group-monopolistic structure of the automobile market (in terms of VAMA's members) made a higher price of assembled cars. The import competition created more choices for consumers and contributed to a decline in car prices. However, the results indicate that the protection status with high tariffs remains almost unchanged, and car prices in Vietnam remain one of the highest in the world. Thus, ignoring the quality aspect, Vietnam's consumers are the big losers in terms of car price.
Domestic manufacturers.
In general, domestic manufacturers are the biggest gainers from the protection policy. The high rate of protection allows the domestic automobile industry to make additional profits from other sectors of the domestic economy through pricing and distribution rents. However, the marginal cost of extra products is increased (Feenstra 2004) .
In terms of economies of scale, Maxcy and Silberston (1959) concluded that the efficient use of the best assembly techniques calls for a volume of 60,000 units per year, which need not be all of one model. There are probably further smaller gains at higher volume but significant economies in car assembly appear to be exhausted at about a volume of 100,000 units. Tables   5 and 7 show that no Vietnam automobile company caught that level of production to have economies of scale. In 2007, Vindaco (Daihatsu) was the first automaker exiting the industry, and the small market size, or more directly, the economies of scale was one of the main reasons for this leaving.
However, the FDI automakers have continued to operate and some other companies have continued to enter the industry because they still get profits, in spite of no economies of scale.
Their profits come from the high price, meaning high protection, rather than the market itself.
That may be why the FDI automakers do not want to implement their localization ratio commitment. They also do not conduct technology transfers as government's expectations, because if they invest more in technology, their profits will decline in a short term, and also in a long term because the level of economies of scale is much desired. Thus, the industry remains 'infant'.
Government. Given that protection reduces competition, the original objective for protecting the automobile industry has hindered the inflow of advanced technology and slowed the development of the domestic automobile industry. Furthermore, the shortage of economies of scales does not encourage foreign investors to use and improve technology (Li 2000) .
Comparing results in Table 8 with the localization targets in Table 1 , we find a failure of the key targets of the policy. The local content ratio is much lower than expectations, especially for tourist cars (from four-to-nine-seat cars). Without economies of scale, FDI automakers postpone investing more to improve the local content ratio. They would prefer basing themselves on government protection to make a profit to transfering modern technologies from home firms. On the other hand, domestic supporting enterprises have small scales to utilize high technology to become main supporting firms rather than supplying only low-value parts.
In terms of welfare, a tariff will reduce social welfare in a 'small importing country'. That is the case of the Vietnam's automobile industry. The higher the tariffs, the bigger the welfare losses. Therefore, with the protection policy, Vietnam's government has failed to achieve a positive net welfare. Again, Vietnam's domestic market is small, which in turn, obstructs economies of scale.
Moreover, the large number of models and production fragmentation lead to high costs for local component suppliers. The industry then tries to lobby for continuing protection because of the high production cost. If accepted by the government, profitability increases for a shortrun, until additional entries reduce profits. When profits come down at a certain level, another cycle of lobbying starts.
Policy implications
Theoretically, there are two different schemes for different status of domestic auto industry and different aims of government (Krugman and Obstfeld 2003) . First, in case domestic automobile industry is at early stage, the government would aim to develop an auto assembly industry first, by temporarily imposing higher tariffs on imported automobiles relatively than tariffs on imported parts. Second, in case there is already a mature domestic auto assembly, the government would aim to develop an auto parts production, by imposing higher tariffs on imported parts relatively than tariffs on imported autos. Therefore, Vietnam's government should revise the protection process and clarify the most suitable strategies and targets for the domestic automobile industry. Then, the government would be able to adjust its policy and choose between import substitution and export promotion directions for the industry. That has also been the case in many countries at early stages of some industries, especially automobile industry.
Conclusion
Using quantitative analysis, the paper investigates the impacts of the protection policy for Vietnam's automobile industry in terms of beneficiaries' targets. Examining the protection process and results of economic performance, we conclude that Vietnam's protection policy on the automobile industry has been a failure. Consumers lose from the high prices; the government loses in achieving the main targets of the protection policy. Producers also lose from high average costs and sub-optimal economic scale. The automobile industry remains 'infant' after a long time of earning profits under protection. Therefore, Vietnam's government needs to clarify and determine a feasible policy target under the specific conditions of the Vietnam's market. This paper is limited in an initial analysis of impacts of the protection policy on the three mainly, directly related sides: consumers, domestic producers and government. Moreover, because of the limitations in data, this paper could not provide a detailed calculation of the effective rate of protection in Vietnam's automobile industry and an exact evaluation on the total welfare losses occurred from the policy. Therefore further research could collect a more detailed, broader data and make a clearer comparison among producer and consumer surpluses in order to support the policy debate. 
